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Abstract:  
 
The tragic events of 9/11 highlighted failures in communication and cooperation 
in the U.S.  intelligence community. Agencies within the community failed to 
“connect the dots” in the intelligence they had, which was cited by the 9/11 
Commission Report as a reason for the terrorist attacks being allowed to happen. 
Since then, the U.S.  intelligence community has made organizational and 
operational reforms towards intelligence sharing. As part of this reform, the 
Director of National Intelligence has introduced web-based social computing 
technology to be used by all members of the intelligence community. This paper 
argues that  while this technology has been adopted into the intelligence 
environment, it has reached a “plateau” in its use, and that intelligence failures 
continue to persist in the U.S.  post-9/11 world. It  identifies and analyzes the 
challenge of implementing social computing and Web 2.0 technology into the 
U.S. intelligence community, as well as account for possible deficiencies in the 
community that might be contributing to these intelligence failures. Finally, the 
definition of “success” in intelligence analysis and social computing is explored, 
and critique against information sharing is put forth. 
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Résumé: 
 
Les événements tragiques du 11/9  ont mis en lumière les défaillances de la 
communication et de la coopération dans la communauté des services de 
renseignement aux États-Unis. Les agences au sein de cette communauté ont 
échoué à relier entre eux les renseignements à leur disposition, un échec cité par 
le rapport de la commission sur le 11/9 comme une des raisons ayant permis les 
attaques terroristes. Depuis lors, la communauté des renseignements américains a 
effectué plusieurs réformes de l’organisation et des opérations de partage de 
renseignements. Dans le cadre de ces réformes, le Director of National 
Intelligence a fourni à tous les membres de la communauté du renseignement des 
technologies Internet du type réseaux sociaux. Cet article explique que, bien que 
ces technologies aient été adoptées par la communauté du renseignement, elles 
ont désormais atteint un plafond dans leur utilisation et les défaillances en matière 
de renseignement persistent dans l’environnement américain post-11/9. L’article 
identifie et analyse les défis liés à la mise en œuvre de technologies Web 2.0 de 
type réseaux sociaux dans la communauté des services de renseignement aux 
États-Unis  d’une part, et fait l’inventaire de lacunes possibles dans la 
communauté pouvant contribuer à ces défaillances d’autre part. Enfin, l’article 
explore la définition de “succès” en matière d’analyse de renseignements et de 
réseaux sociaux tout en abordant les critiques à l’encontre du partage 
d’informations. 
 
Mots-clés: 11/9; Gestion de Crise; Informatique Sociale; Partage d’Information; 
Production Conjoint; Renseignement; Sécurité Nationale  
 
 
 
 
In his seminal piece entitled, “The Wiki and a Blog: Towards a Complex Adaptive Intelligence 
Community” (2005), Calvin Andrus identified using wikis and blogs in the United States 
Intelligence Community (USIC) as a possible solution to their information sharing challenges in 
a world after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks. Andrus asserted that intelligence-
based decision making was moving towards real-time, live environments, and that the 
“intelligence-decision-implementation cycle”,  such as when new security issues emerge in 
Baghdad and are vetted through decision-makers in Washington, can now be as short as 15 
minutes. The ability to provide concise and quality intelligence under a compressed cycle 
requires comprehensive intelligence sharing using central locations of information within the 
USIC. Andrus argues that such tools have the potential to solve this challenge. 
More broadly, it has been debated within academia and the U.S. government that the 
events of 9/11  could have been prevented had there been more effective interagency 
communication to “connect the dots” in intelligence gaps. For example, the intelligence the 
National Security Agency (NSA) held on American Airlines flight 77 hijacker Nawaf al Hazmi 
in January, 2000, was not communicated effectively with other relevant USIC agencies to assess 
his level of threat. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Report 
(the 9/11 Commission Report; 2004) identified this example and the broader lack of interagency Making Friends in Dark Shadows: An Examination of the Use of  
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communication as one of a number of failures that led to the terrorist attacks. Since then, the 
value of a collective network of intelligence agencies collaborating together in an integrated 
structure has become a focal point and a strategic aim for the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI). The community has also been focusing on organizational reform involving 
greater information sharing, removing the silos (or the practice of “stove-piping”) of information 
between agencies, and moving away from the “need-to-know” treatment of intelligence to a 
“responsibility-to-provide” model (ODNI, 2008b: 8.) This fundamental shift in strategy has been 
an attempt to improve on the intelligence gaps that plagued the USIC before 9/11, a period in 
time which was highlighted by a relative and considerable lack of cooperation among agencies to 
prevent terrorist attacks and threats to national security (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
Social computing and Web 2.0 technology, two concepts that employ using social web-
based software to connect users with information, have grown in their use in the USIC since 
Andrus’ study, which chronologically coincided with the recognition of intelligence failures by 
the 9/11 Commission Report. Examples of this technology include blogs, instant messaging, 
social networking, social bookmarking, collaborative information building (e.g. wikis), and other 
forms of engagement that foster two-way, social interaction (Von Kortzfleisch, Mergel, 
Manouchehri & Schaarschmidt, 2008). Major social computing-based initiatives implemented by 
the ODNI, such as Intellipedia (a wiki information resource) and A-Space (a social networking 
platform), have been designed to improve the analysis and provide consumers, such as policy 
makers, with timely and relevant intelligence products. However, since their adoption in the mid 
2000’s, these tools have “plateaued”. In other words, they have reached their maximum usable 
potential (Jackson, 2009, Rasmussen, 2010). Similarly, there is an emerging concern within the 
USIC itself that these Web 2.0 tools are not reaching far enough in sharing intelligence – they 
serve complementary roles rather than being entrenched as mandatory tools in the intelligence 
cycle (Dixon, 2009; Dixon & McNamara, 2008). These same processes, including the quality of 
analytic tradecraft, have also come under much debate in the new millennium, particularly since 
9/11. 
This paper examines the current use of social computing tools in the USIC, and will 
analyze their effectiveness within the larger intelligence cycle process. This paper assumes that 
the social computing tools used in the USIC are part of a larger information sharing strategy as 
established by the ODNI, which itself is part of a larger national intelligence strategy currently in 
place (ODNI, 2009a). Additionally, the assumption is made that intelligence failures still persist 
since 9/11, and that social computing tools and the intelligence cycle have challenges that will 
require reforms if the ODNI envisions acceptance and thorough use of these tools to meet 
organizational objectives. 
 
Web 2.0 and Social Computing Use in the U.S. Intelligence Community 
 
An analysis of social computing cannot be made without understanding these new technologies 
and their roles in the context of a cultural shift towards a more collaborative and cooperative 
environment as a whole-of-community approach (that is, bringing all of the relevant agencies 
within the USIC and their partners together cooperatively to achieve this shift as a whole.) 
Breaking down the barriers of distrust and promoting interagency collaboration is a focal point 
from recent information sharing challenges in the USIC. The 2009 National Intelligence Strategy Andrew Chomik  98 
identifies these challenges as central to building greater success in gathering intelligence and 
collecting reliable data (Enterprise Objectives #1 and #4) (ODNI, 2009a). 
The idea of social computing (and Web 2.0) technology was a nebulous area of 
Information Technology (IT) solutions for organizations large and small. While the technology 
seemed to offer greater collaboration efforts and ways for normal people with little or no 
programming experience to engage user content on the web (e.g., the growth in use of Web 2.0 
sites such as Wikipedia, Myspace and Facebook in the early and mid 2000s), how it could be 
applied into an organizational setting was not entirely clear. It was in this same timeframe that 
United States suffered the devastating terrorist attacks of 9/11, and raised a multitude of concerns 
and questions in the U.S. government and the public about the effectiveness of the USIC’s 
knowledge of terrorist activities and the actionable intelligence they had (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). The security landscape was rapidly changing 
due to the amorphous nature of unconventional non-state threats such as al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, along with their increasing ability to use technology for nefarious means (Kohlmann, 
2006). A changing landscape required a fundamental shift in national security strategy; terrorism 
and national security threats were becoming increasingly decentralized and sophisticated. The 
USIC needed methods to become more responsive and to transform into a more cohesive unit of 
cooperating agencies that shared their resources, rather than 16 different silos operating 
independently of each other.  
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) identified information sharing as one of the primary 
weaknesses that led to the attacks, which was brought about by a failure among the various U.S. 
government agencies and departments to communicate effectively. It identified the “need-to-
know” culture as a crucial bottleneck to effective intelligence sharing, and suggested that 
security requirements at the time were “nurturing overclassification and excessive 
compartmentation (compartmentalization) of information among agencies” (2004: 417). The 
Commission went further in recommending that intelligence and data collected should be in its 
most shareable and accessible form to all, but still subject to the proper security clearances and 
with an audit trail on queries. More decentralized data among the USIC should also be accessible 
across agency lines, and a “trusted information network” was recommended to be designed for 
facilitating greater cooperation in information sharing (2004: 418). 
Legislative action soon followed. The U.S. Congress created the Director of National 
Intelligence role by passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act in 2004, a body 
of legislation designed “to ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information 
within the Intelligence Community consistent with national security requirements” (ODNI, 
2008b: 6). The legislation brought together all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies under one umbrella 
organization, a structure needed to provide central direction for better information sharing. 
Subsequent legislation was entrenched through Executive Orders 12333 and 13470 and 
Intelligence Community Directive Number 501, which refined the guidance provided to agencies 
on the new technologies and methods to be implemented (ODNI, 2008b; 2009b).  
Michael McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) from 2007 to 2009, 
brought forth two implementation plans for parlaying information strategy into action. The “100 
Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration” introduced a number of initiatives, including 
launching a civilian joint duty program, improving research capabilities and upgrading analytical 
tools for analysts, and prioritized information sharing as one of the primary objectives (ODNI, 
2007a). Part of this information sharing effort was to draw lessons from the “Web 2.0 
revolution” and create the same type of social networks, collaborative knowledge and data Making Friends in Dark Shadows: An Examination of the Use of  
Social Computing Strategy Within the United States Intelligence Community Since 9/11 
99 
“push” found on publicly available social websites (Wertheimer, 2008). The same plan was 
extended further in McConnell’s “500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration”, focusing on 
“core” and “enabling” initiatives that provided more detail for achieving collaboration goals, 
such as introducing new hiring practices and web training, tradecraft improvements and 
administration changes, new IT programs such as the Single Information Environment, data 
collection strategies, and system and architecture planning (ODNI, 2007b). 
For the USIC, the primary social computing tools that were introduced  included 
Intellipedia, a community-wide, crowd-sourced wiki used to build a database of information that 
is only accessible within the USIC and across secure internal networks JWICS, SIPRNet and 
Intelink-U (and built using the same technology as popular online reference site Wikipedia), and 
A-Space, a social networking tool that allows USIC analysts to connect and collaborate in online 
workspaces. Additional tools used in the USIC include CompanyCommand, an online forum for 
servicemen to share expertise (Dixon, 2007), microblogging services such as eChirp, Yammer 
and IBM SameTime, Google search functionality, and enterprise content and collaboration 
software such as Microsoft SharePoint (Hoover, 2009; Intelligence Community Chief 
Technology Officer, 2010; Jacks, 2009). 
It should be noted that during the increasing adoption of these Web 2.0 tools, intelligence 
successes were being made that had major impacts on both military and foreign policy. Two such 
successes included the assassinations of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006 and Osama bin Laden in 
2011, which signalled major intelligence victories for the White House. Both of these events 
have reflected positively on the White Houses’ ability to use intelligence to eliminate key threats 
to American interests at home and abroad, although caution was issued that these successes do 
not signal the end of the larger “war on terror” (Rutenberg, 2006; They got him; After Osama bin 
Laden, 2011).  
Unfortunately, while gains in strategy and information sharing were being made, 
intelligence failures continued to plague the post-9/11 security environment. One of the most 
criticized failures was the prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction 
program. The Senate Selection Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) concluded that serious 
analytical errors were made by analysts, collectors and managers, and that a pervading sense of 
“groupthink” was evident in the assembly of such intelligence (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). 
Among other well-known incidents, President Barack Obama has also cited the “mix of human 
and systemic (intelligence) failures” by the USIC to thwart the December 25, 2009 attempted 
bombing of a Northwest flight by a Nigerian-born extremist as “completely unacceptable” and 
that there was information that “should have been pieced together” (Meyer, Nicholas & Semuels, 
2009).  The 2011 Arab Spring has also raised concerns about intelligence failures. Dianne 
Feinstein, chairwoman of the SSCI raised issue with the intelligence collected on the uprisings, 
saying the United States “missed warnings” on the events that took place in Tunisia and Egypt 
(Associated Free Press, 2011), and that the situation revealed intelligence “was way behind the 
times” and “inadequate” (Rogin, 2011).  
 
Where Has Intelligence Gone Wrong Since 9/11? 
 
Failures in intelligence analysis since the formation of the ODNI and 9/11 have not ceased to 
continue. Research and academia is rife with studies and analysis of failures in the intelligence 
cycle, with one of the most maligned phases  being analysis. However, there are additional 
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the intelligence cycle is broken, or that the intelligence process alone is the culprit for continued 
failures. An examination of challenges in social computing, then, cannot discount the larger 
issues that are often cited as to why intelligence failures happen. Although by no means an 
exhaustive list, the following subthemes provide some insight into these very gaps, although 
each can undoubtedly stand alone as their own fields of research. 
 
The Intelligence Community Has Become Large and Costly 
 
In 2010, the Washington Post published a series of investigative articles on the state of the USIC 
called Top Secret America, which the newspaper put together based on government documents, 
contracts, job descriptions, property records, corporate and social networking sites, records, and 
hundreds of interviews with USIC staff and officials. The findings of the investigation included 
that 854,000 people had “Top Secret” security clearance, 50,000 intelligence reports are 
produced each year, and that public spending on the USIC amounted to $75 billion, a number 
almost 250 per cent larger than it was on 9/11 (Priest & Arkin, 2010). However, while the 
investigation is a journalistic effort to shed light on the size of the community, others argue that 
the community is simply making up for the downsizing it suffered between the end of the Cold 
War and 9/11. In this sense, the community may not be coming to full terms with its size and 
expansion, and thus, not understanding its own reform in a post-9/11 world (Kerbel, 2008; 
Zagert, 2005). 
Wasteful spending is also another critique of the expansive USIC. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, for example, spent $170 million on case-handling software that, after too many 
bugs and frustrations with the system, was scrapped (Thompson, 2006; Zegart, 2005). Another 
example points to overly-expensive satellite programs for technical information collection and 
processing, perpetuated by competing requirements between the intelligence community and the 
Department of Defense, which was compounded by a lack of effective Congressional oversight 
(Best, 2011). These examples are microcosms of larger (and chronic) spending problems. 
However, such problems of wasteful spending and the overall size of the intelligence community 
budget are on the radar of the Senate Select Committee to reform (Feinstein, 2010), but are 
indicative of strategic issues through budgetary matters. 
 
Processes in the Intelligence Cycle are Problematic 
 
There is much debate about how the analytical process in the intelligence cycle is faulty. 
Similarly, there is also debate whether the intelligence that is created is disseminated 
appropriately and in full disclosure. Since consumers often rely on intelligence analysis to make 
bureaucratic decisions, these two processes are inextricably tied. The connection between 
intelligence failures and the effectiveness of the analysis and dissemination processes are 
subfields of research on their own and are beyond the scope of this paper. However, the analysis 
process and social computing tools are inextricably tied if they are considered tactical tools at the 
disposal of the analyst to perform their tasks.  
The USIC often reflects on its intelligence deficiencies. The Studies of Intelligence 
journal that is produced by the Central Intelligence Agency or the numerous reports and papers 
that are produced by the U.S. military are just two of the many internal sources of critique for 
policy makers to consider. It is often that the community points to a lack of “strategic warning” 
or an ability to see beyond tactical levels of intelligence analysis. Citing the failure to provide Making Friends in Dark Shadows: An Examination of the Use of  
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strategic warning during the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, one report suggests that intelligence 
gathered amounted to nothing more than “story-telling”, and that the only proper way to move 
forward is through better analysis of potential developments (or, according to Davis (2002), 
“linchpin analysis”). The production cycle also puts a premium on being agile and flexible, but 
often  results in producing intelligence that lacks strategic foresight or identifying trends for 
which to communicate effectively to policy makers and consumers (Davis, 2002; Petersen, 
2011). Other government-produced studies often indicate flaws with analysis interpretation and 
critical thinking skills as problematic.  
Academic research is also supportive of the assertion that there is a lack of strategic 
foresight. Lefebvre (2004) argues that critical thinking is important, and that there may be too 
much emphasis on current intelligence, although intelligence analysts should not be expected to 
“predict the future” with perfect measures of accuracy. Similarly, Kerbel (2008) identifies that, if 
intelligence were compared as an “art” versus a “science”, the artistic side would need to be 
cultivated, as it is this that can provide reason and hypothesis to an otherwise scientific process 
of data collection and systematic information process.  
Again, a common theme among the analytic process is that analysis is not reaching the 
intended strategic level required to make informed policy decisions through disseminated 
intelligence. The finished intelligence model might be serving to inhibit good analysis, as data-
focused reports captured at a specific time may not be sufficient to “connect the dots” required to 
improve the quality of disseminated analysis. Intelligence analysis may also be negatively 
affected by other factors, including (but not limited to) cognitive bias (Lefebvre, 2004; Johnston, 
2005), misunderstandings of requirements between policy makers and intelligence analysts 
(Petersen, 2011; Kerbel & Orcott, 2010), or a lack of proper training (Ackerman, 2007; Heuer, 
2005). Still, technology (and thus, social computing tools) can play a large role in the improving 
the quality of an analyst`s work (Lefebrve, 2004). 
 
Information Sharing—A Chronic Challenge 
 
Information sharing among departments and agencies within organizations has historically been 
a difficult task to achieve, particularly with federal agencies. Trust is a central requirement for 
agencies to engage in consistent and friendly information sharing activities with other agencies. 
Federal agencies, in particular, require a degree of trust that is unlike other organizations. Liu 
and Chetal (2005) argue that these agencies suffer “conflicts of interest” when they are forced to 
share information, which results in a lack of trust between agencies that does not mutually 
benefit each agency involved. This “lack of trust” between agencies has been a historical 
characteristic of the USIC, as numerous academic and government-produced reports have 
identified this and the “stove-piping” of information from each other as chronic challenges. The 
9/11 Commission Report (2004) refers to the latter issue multiple times as one of the gaps in 
intelligence coordination that allowed the 9/11 attacks to happen. 
However, agencies and departments within the newly-structured USIC were thrust into a 
hierarchy that imposed overarching strategies and mandates while still having to maintain their 
already pre-existing internal agency strategies, goals and resources. This new layer of hierarchy, 
supported by numerous ODNI strategies (ODNI, 2007a; 2007b), imposed immediate pressure on 
these agencies to improve intelligence quality through better information sharing. Such an 
immediate organizational shift and imposition of new strategy has created compartmentalized 
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practices, especially as tailored intelligence for consumers (particularly policy makers) is in 
strong demand (Committee on Behavioral and Social Science Research to Improve Intelligence 
Analysis for National Security [CBSSRIIANI], 2011). However, assistance has been set up to 
support analysts and their collaboration requirements. The Analytic Transformation program 
provides solutions for analysts to organize large volumes of data and improve the quality of 
analysis through better training standards and technology use (ODNI, 2008a). In other words, the 
program seeks to “change how (intelligence analysts) approach analysis” with a focus on better 
interagency collaboration (Lowenthal, 2009: 144). 
 
Why Have Social Computing Tools Plateaued in the Intelligence Community? 
 
The Tools are Complementary and not Official 
 
This requires an examination of how we measure success, and how these tools are viewed as 
essential to those who use them. Consider that both users and proponents of these tools have 
suggested that their unofficial status as part of the analysis phase in the intelligence process is a 
contributing factor to the problem. In the case of Intellipedia and A-Space, it has been suggested 
these tools only serve as complementary rather than mandatory roles to pre-existing bureaucratic 
processes, and that duplication of work is a likely consequence of using them (Dixon & 
McNamara, 2008; Jackson, 2009). While these studies opine from the users’ perspective, Chris 
Rasmussen, Living Intelligence System Program Manager in the USIC and one of the 
community’s most well-known Web 2.0 technology proponents, also makes the case that this is 
problematic, and prevents a true “reform” in the intelligence system (Rasmussen, 2010). 
 
An Environment for Failure 
 
It is also possible that the increase in intelligence spending since 9/11  has created an 
environment where social computing tools are too ineffective to provide any significant solution 
to policies and strategies asking for better collaboration and information sharing. Rasmussen 
suggests that the spending surplus not only created duplication of data and efforts, but also led to 
a sprawling IC structure and a fragmented intelligence process that perpetuates siloed analytical 
reporting and cemented the bad habits of “stove-piping” (Rasmussen, 2010). Such problems 
were echoed by the Pentagon, identifying data duplication as problematic from supporting two 
wars since 2001 (Ferguson, 2010). Rasmussen continues by arguing that the most effective 
innovations in organizational technology are those that are considered disruptive rather than 
incremental. Intellipedia and A-Space were not entrenched in the intelligence cycle workflow to 
complete disseminated products, which then relates back to the `complementary` role problem 
discussed earlier. Zagert (2005) also considers that the entrenched policies and cultures of each 
individual agency within the USIC serve as reoccurring problems when information sharing 
attempts are made, or when agencies are expected to collaboration with each other. One such 
opinion from within an agency in the USIC demonstrated a stark reminder of this engrained 
culture resistant to change when he commented that “real men don’t type” (Zegart, 2005).  
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What Measures Success? 
 
To examine this question, two areas of study must be acknowledge and examined—intelligence 
analysis and Web 2.0 adoption. Since preventing intelligence failures pertains to the intelligence 
cycle and the technology used within it, these two areas of study are inextricably tied. 
 
Measuring Success in Intelligence Analysis 
 
Defining success in intelligence analysis is not an easy undertaking. Consider that intelligence, 
by its nature, is meant to prevent possible threats from happening, both on home soil and broad. 
Is success measured, then, by the number of threats foiled (and subsequently is failure 
compounded by the number of threats that were not countered)? Or is there another 
classification? Success is a fragile and complicated function to measure, especially as the USIC 
is routinely subject to demonization if a threat goes undetected, or if intelligence is considered 
faulty. 
Lowenthal (2009: 147) challenges that “good” intelligence meets certain requirements: 
 
•  Intelligence is timely: it can be served to consumers when needed; 
•  Intelligence is tailored: it  contains specific information that does not lose 
objectivity or is not politicized; 
•  Intelligence is digestible: it  has to be understood by consumers with no 
obscure analysis; and, 
•  Intelligence is clear: declaration is made about what is known, and what is 
unknown, and should indicate confidence in its material. 
 
While these are general considerations, much has been studied on what constitutes effective 
intelligence analysis. Some suggest a revamping of the analytical process, including solving 
some of the earlier problems mentioned (e.g., cognitive bias issues and training). Regardless, 
defining success and failure in intelligence is a field of research that both academia and the 
intelligence community regularly attempt to explain. 
Additionally, it should be noted that in producing intelligence products, there is a history 
of focusing on failed intelligence rather than successful intelligence. The IC is often critiqued by 
policy makers, media and the public on the failures it suffers, and tends to have the proverbial 
finger pointed at when intelligence fails, which damages credibility (Petersen, 2011). John F. 
Kennedy once said of the CIA that “its successes will be secret and its failures will be 
trumpeted” (Ibid: 15). As such, failures that occur result in much debate about where the process 
went wrong, or where the gaps are that need to be addressed. The definition of success in 
intelligence analysis is also difficult to measure when high-ranking, public officials such as the 
President or the SSCI issue warnings about intelligence methods, shaking public confidence in 
the effectiveness of their intelligence community. 
 
Measuring Success in Web 2.0 and Social Computing Adoption 
 
By the same token, social computing, or Web 2.0 technology has its own set of measurements 
for success. There is considerable material published on the success of Web 2.0 and social 
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academia. There are, however, some commonalities among successful adoptions of these 
technologies. In an article produced in McKinsey Quarterly by leading management consultancy 
firm McKinsey & Company, Eric Lui, Andy Miller, and Roger P. Roberts (2009) identified six 
factors for successful adoption of Web 2.0 technology in large organizations: 
 
•  bottom-up “grassroots” use of the technology (with “champions” of the 
technology at the top of the organizational hierarchy);  
•  acceptance of natural use in these technologies (that is, letting users define 
what works and what doesn’t); 
•  these tools must be in the business workflow; participation must be made 
mandatory so as to reduce duplicating work; 
•  appeal to the participants needs; reward and recognize contributors for their 
content; 
•  target heavy users for pushing the technology; certain users need to serve as 
motivation for others to participate; and, 
•  balance risk and freedom; organizations need to find a balance between risk 
management over the content posted and the ability for users to post without 
fear of reprisal. 
 
Similar arguments have been made by other pieces of literature, especially in the field known to 
some as “Government 2.0”.  Bartoski and Hadden (2010) recommend that supplementing 
“management thinking” with “design thinking” in the public sector will encourage the best ideas 
and technologies to surface from a pool of many (akin to the acceptance of natural use put 
forward by Lui, Miller, and Roberts). They also suggest that “viral” change is needed to build 
faith in the product, and participation in conversations and peer networks are expectations that 
should happen in all levels of the organization. Similar conclusions were found in journalist and 
author James Surowiecki’s The Widsom of Crowds (2004), a seminal and popular piece on the 
effective use on the power of crowds to build knowledge bases of information. 
While these recommendations are put forth by private sector authors, there are common 
factors that public sectors share in terms of organizational requirements for social computing and 
Web 2.0. One such example of a public sector adoption of Web 2.0 is NASA’s introduction of 
“Spacebook” a social networking platform for NASA employees used to “create a culture of 
engagement and collaboration among employees” (Thornton, 2009). The service was introduced 
to also create a secure social network separate from publicly available social computing sites 
Twitter and Facebook in order to help alleviate security concerns, as well as provide tools for the 
next generations of scientists and engineers to support their work (Ibid).  
From a pragmatic perspective, social computing has proven to be a popular endeavour 
among USIC employees. Intellipedia now has over 1.28 million pages, used by over 180,000 
users contributing content (Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer, 2010). A-Space 
has also achieved significant adoption rates and usage among USIC analysts (Dixon, 2009). 
Intellipedia was also integral to information sharing during the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, 
and won Homeland Security Awards in 2009 for the improvements it made in information 
sharing among analysts (Wu, 2010). This, however, does not mean that Web 2.0 has been 
effective for producing intelligence. An attempt to produce a  National Intelligence Estimate 
solely on Intellipedia itself was ultimately rejected and sent back into the conventional stream of 
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to conventional bureaucratic processes suggests that using Intellipedia and other social 
computing tools as channels for building and disseminating intelligence are problematic, and 
lacking in a cohesive, fluid workflow of collaboration among agencies 
 
Effective Use of Social Computing in the Intelligence Community 
 
Ultimately, the success of social computing tools will have to be measured on the basis of how 
the users see its benefits, and whether the larger intelligence analysis process is considered 
successful by bureaucrats, policy makers and academia. These tools, however, are still in their 
infancy; epistemic knowledge around the use of social computing tools has so far been limited to 
a handful of industry professionals and academic experts with varying levels of expertise on 
team dynamics and social computing technology. While studies such as those of Dixon and 
McNamara (2008; 2009) provide observational insight into what users think of these tools, these 
studies are neither comprehensive enough nor do they measure long-term effects that social 
computing have on the actual analysis process. Additionally, academic research on collaboration 
efforts and information sharing, for which social computing tools would be associated with, tend 
to focus on the analysis process itself rather than the actual tools used. 
Review of currently analytic processes is also not up to par. While the Office of Analytic 
Integrity and the ODNI work with IC agencies to evaluate internal analysis procedures, the USIC 
mainly relies on the judgments of experts in analysis assessment to provide direction, rather than 
systemic or scientific methods to deliver results that might otherwise generate more accurate tool 
assessment (CBSSRIIANI, 2011). Perhaps the closest official attempt to measure the effective 
use of information sharing tools came from the CASE Program Completion Report (Sickels, 
2008), but this program was plagued by issues of analytic quality and the subject nature of its 
variables (Schroeder, 2011). Furthermore, these tools have not been implemented long enough to 
understand their long-term effects on the analytical process, which itself may pose challenges in 
that these tools serve a complementary role rather than being firmly entrenched into the 
intelligence production workflow.  
Similarly, conventional security problems have persisted in the adoption of new 
technologies and Web 2.0 products. Leaders within the ODNI (including former directors 
themselves) have expressed concern of the difficulty in keeping up with the Web 2.0 
“revolution” (Ackerman, 2008), in addition to having to focus on the security issues that 
accompany full, integrated data systems among all 16 agencies. These conventional challenges 
include trusting their own workforce to safeguard shared information, and dealing with the 
resistance that still exists among some of the USIC workforce in adopting new technologies 
(Ibid). To complicate matters further, USIC leaders have also explicitly stressed that cyber 
terrorism is their primary concern when it comes to web issues; a lack of a comprehensive cyber 
strategy will only serve to inhibit overall web use within the USIC at home and abroad 
(McConnell, 2010).  
 
Critics of Information Sharing in the USIC 
 
Information sharing is also not without its risks. Particularly for the USIC, the issues of privacy 
and information leaks are a common theme among critics of information sharing theories. These 
fears have also been substantiated in recent events. The controversy surrounding diplomatic 
cables stolen from the Top Secret computer network SIPRNet, which is shared by the military Andrew Chomik  106 
and intelligence community, and given to whistle-blowing website Wikileaks have raised 
concerns about how far information sharing has extended under the ODNI. The leak occurred 
when Pvt. Bradley Manning, a low-ranking serviceman, stole hundreds of thousands of 
diplomatic cables and sensitive information documents, which led to public embarrassment on 
the part of the U.S. government and left questions about the ease of accessibility into otherwise 
secure networks used in the USIC, such as SIPRNet or the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS), both of which Manning had access to (Perlow, 2010). Hilary 
Clinton, Secretary of State, remarked that the leaks amounted to an “attack on America’s foreign 
policy interests” and on the “international community”, and has “put people’s lives in danger” 
(Aroon, 2010). Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in October 2010 that 
the leaks posed a “chilling effect” on the community’s willingness to share information, although 
in March, 2011, he determined that the fallout was “still being assessed” (Ackerman, 2011). 
Support, however, has leaned on the side of continued information sharing. Jay Bosanko, 
director of the National Archives’ Information Security Oversight Office, remarked that it would 
be a step backwards to roll back information sharing initiatives, while Ellen McCarthy, president 
of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance suggested that the benefits of information 
sharing “far outweigh the costs” and said the community should focus on “operational security 
and counterespionage” instead (Reilly, 2010). Defense Secretary Robert Gates has also reiterated 
that the impact on American foreign policy was “modest” and not the “melt down” others were 
making it out to be (Ackerman, 2010). It remains to be determined the long-term effects that 
Wikileaks will ultimately have on the information sharing policies in the USIC. 
One concern also revolves around trusting users to contribute in an appropriate manner to 
information-based, crowd-sourced material. There is little preventing an intelligence analyst 
from providing incorrect data or misinformation, nor is there from analysts making mistakes by 
error or by negligence while managing data in these systems—allowing them to the freedom to 
contribute content is one of the risks taken with Web 2.0 technology (although under 
Surowiecki’s idea of crowd-sourcing, such information would theoretically be subject to the 
quality control and vetting by other analysts, and likely subject to other pre-existing methods of 
information proofing). The National Intelligence Strategy explicitly states that the USIC needs to 
have strong identity management and secure networks to prevent disclosure of sensitive material 
and from such negligence or errors taking place (ODNI, 2009a). Particularly for Web 2.0 
technology, risk can manifest from sharing information or conversations on tools that can 
perpetuate to other areas of shared networks. For example, an analyst writes sensitive content 
using an internal microblogging system (such as Yammer or in a collaboration space), which 
may be captured in another analysts’  newsfeed on A-Space or propagated as “pushed” 
information to Intellipedia which might be classified as sensitive. The inherent danger in Web 
2.0 use is the very factor that makes it useful—it interlinks multiple social computing tools and 
data together; information can be transmitted without a user knowing how far that information 
travels. However, such is the risk inherent in using social networks and social computing tools, 
as other industry and academic studies that have examined the use and governance of social 
computing have shown (Maximize benefits . . ., 2011; Strufe, 2010). Critics may also point to the 
ease in which Web 2.0 technology integrates with publicly available services on the Internet. 
Again, this risk pertains to the leakage of information, but from a security standpoint, the USIC 
is behind a sophisticated firewall system that is significantly “insulated” from public networks 
(Kenyon, 2010). Similarly, data duplication may also pose a problem if aggregated data from Making Friends in Dark Shadows: An Examination of the Use of  
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different networks and databases are not vetted against each other (Francis, 2011; Rasmussen, 
2010).  
 
Conclusion 
 
Andrus asserted that a critical mass must be established before a fundamental change can truly 
take hold. Even though the USIC has adopted social computing and Web 2.0 technologies to 
improve interagency information sharing, it remains to be seen whether the current state of social 
computing tools in the USIC will elevate to a point where not using them is a failure in itself. 
The issue is further complicated as intelligence agencies begin to migrate their data to federated, 
central locations, and direction from the top of the community implies that collaboration and 
information sharing are the goals and objectives of the USIC. There is no shortage of collected 
data and analyzed intelligence: 50,000 intelligence products produced each year inevitably create 
huge knowledge bases for reference and usage, most of which go unread (Thompson, 2006). By 
the same token, the large mass of information must be vetted and filtered to collectors and 
analysts entrenched in the intelligence cycle so only useful and relevant data will help build 
products ready for dissemination. This information must similarly reflect in the quality of the 
analysis being conducted, which will ultimately be judged by bureaucrats who, for better or 
worse, use the information in guiding American policy. 
Additionally, measuring the success of social computing tools cannot be done without 
looking at the larger information sharing strategy in the USIC, which itself is a strategy within an 
even larger national intelligence strategy. While the ODNI has made it clear what these strategies 
are, social computing tools must not be considered exclusive from the intelligence process, 
particularly in the analysis phase. Tactical success of these tools may be measured in statistics of 
usage, contributions and satisfaction made by analysts who use them, but success will 
undoubtedly be tied to how effective the intelligence cycle as a whole is measured. Removing 
the “stove-pipes” and “connecting the dots” are continually scrutinized concepts, particularly by 
policymakers, the media and the general public, especially as the USIC continues its strategy of 
openness and transparency. However, conflict and power are ever-present in politics, and 
agencies have deeply entrenched, bureaucratic processes that, while the 9/11 Commission Report 
viewed these as structural problems, points to larger organizational and culture changes that need 
to be made for true reform (Zegart, 2005). To this end, success, in the absence of a clear, 
industry-wide definition, is likely to be viewed in the eye of the beholder, for which zero 
intelligence gaps entirely will be the expected goal. 
 
Areas for Future Study 
 
Some in the intelligence community have begun to voice possible directions in where to take 
social computing use in the USIC. Using social software as part of a reformed intelligence cycle 
that augments existing production systems and introduces a new “joint production method” is 
one such solution advocated by some (Rasmussen, 2010; Schroeder, 2011). Social computing 
tools must be reinforcing of the intelligence cycle, and used as a set of mandatory (not 
complementary) technologies that advance the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
intelligence products. Since such reforms would potentially be considered “disruptive 
technology” (Dixon, 2008), these changes will likely require a paradigm shift in organizational 
culture, management support, and a check and balance system so as to continually measure the Andrew Chomik  108 
performance of analysts in the intelligence cycle who use these entrenched technologies on a 
regular basis.  
If such production reforms are implemented, it will likely have a considerable impact in 
making reforms in analytical tradecraft within the USIC. While there are many works of 
literature that exist in determining the best course of action for the USIC to improve the 
intelligence cycle, technology-based analytical reforms have shown potential in overcoming the 
challenges posed by chronic “stove-piping” of information, a lack of trust among USIC agencies, 
and better interagency collaboration through intelligence sharing. However, much more 
sustained use of social computing tools and analysis of their use are likely required before any 
clear and effective strategy can be sufficiently developed. There can be no nebulous use of these 
tools going forward if the United States is to prepare their intelligence efforts for the rapid-
response, digitally-oriented future of national security and to operate under a “responsibility-to-
provide” information sharing strategy, something the USIC has struggled with ten years after 
9/11. 
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